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CHAPTER III
The Two Battles of Trenton
BY FREDERICK
L. FERRIS
I. The First Battle
“NOWHERE
in the annals of warfare,” says General William S. Stryker, “can be
found a counterpart of the winter campaign of Washington and his army
in 1776-77 -that army which left the vicinity of New York a ragged,
starved, defeated, demoralized band, which passed through the Jerseys
and over the river, then dashed upon the Hessian advance, punished the
flank of the British line, doubled on its own bloody tracks through
the village of Princeton, and at last marched into quarters an army
of victors.” 1
1 The Battles
of Trenton and Princeton (Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1898),
p. 1. This is the definitive work dealing with Revolutionary events
in Trenton and vicinity. General Stryker was a painstaking and scholarly
author who devoted his spare time for twenty-seven years to preparation
for his great task and rewrote his manuscript five times. Professor
William Starr Myers, of Princeton University, editing the same author’s
posthumous work, The Battle of Monmouth, has borne testimony
that he found Stryker as an historian “accurate, sound, judicial and
scholarly.” Sir George Otto Trevelyan, Baronet, in his authoritative
work, The American Revolution, says of Stryker’s commentary on
Trenton and Princeton: “A better book on the subject could not be compiled.”
Living on the scene of the memorable engagements here, General Stryker
from childhood was steeped in local Revolutionary lore. He gathered
much of his knowledge almost first-hand from the families of survivors.
Quite inevitably, therefore, the author of the present chapter has found
it necessary and desirable to lean heavily upon Stryker’s immortal account
of the Battles of Trenton as both a factual and an interpretative guide.
DARK DAYS FOR THE PATRIOTS
This is a simple statement of fact. Disaster after
disaster had come to the Americans during the summer of 1776. The defeat
on Long Island was followed by the indecisive engagements at Harlem
Heights and White Plains; and then ensued the collapse of Fort Washington
and Fort Lee. Having lost 329 officers and 4,430 men in his unsuccessful
attempt to defend the lower Hudson, Washington found himself in command
of a force of not more than 4,000 poorly equipped, discouraged troops,
facing a situation which demanded quick action but offered the smallest
promise of success.
It
would have been absurd further to resist the British. It would have
meant annihilation to linger near New York. Washington, accordingly,
ordered a retreat through the Jerseys, not knowing whether he would
be forced to continue on to Virginia or even beyond the Alleghany Mountains
themselves. Appealing to Governor William Livingston, of New Jersey,
for reinforcements, he wrote: “The critical situation of our affairs
and the movements of the enemy make some further and immediate exertions
absolutely necessary.”
Anxious
to avoid being caught between the Hackensack and Passaic Rivers, Washington
started the march southward on November 21, posting his force at Newark
within the next two days. Five days later this position was abandoned,
and the Continentals resumed falling back before the pressure of the
British host. That the pressure was being persistently applied is indicated
by the fact that the enemy advance-guard entered Newark even while the
American rear-guard withdrew.
Upon
reaching Brunswick on November 29, the patriot army was joined by a
small force under Brigadier General Lord Stirling, but the recruits
for which Washington kept hopefully looking failed to materialize until
the army reached Trenton, and at the latter point it was only a small
detachment of New Jersey militia which “volunteered to assist the forlorn
cause.” 2
2 Stryker, p.
18. This detachment included men from the Hunterdon and Middlesex brigades,
under command of Colonel Isaac Smith and Colonel John Neilson, respectively.
After
doing considerable damage to the bridge over the Raritan River, the
Americans proceeded to Princeton, arriving on the morning of December
2 and pushing on almost immediately to Trenton where the army was posted
the same day.
Cornwallis, reaching Brunswick, sought General Howe’s
permission to press on and attack Washington before the Delaware could
be crossed. But Howe delayed, and the British thus lost what was for
them a rare opportunity to end the war at a stroke. Washington, indeed,
attributed the success of the retreat to “nothing but the infatuation
of the enemy.”
Meanwhile
the shores of the Delaware were being combed for boats. They were obtained
in sufficient number, and on December 7 and 8 plied from one side of
the river to the other, transporting the Continentals, gun and baggage,
to the Pennsylvania shore.
Nor
was the movement premature, for Cornwallis was already on his way to
Trenton, being able, on December 9, to attempt a crossing, and meeting
with failure only because the Americans by this time had obtained all
the available boats and placed them, under a strong guard, on the opposite
side of the stream.
THE RIVER CHECKS THE BRITISH
It
was the river, in other words, which checked the British pursuit. Inertia
and delay quite literally had permitted the patriots to escape from
the clutches of General Howe. For the enemy, there remained nothing
to do but wait until the Delaware should freeze sufficiently to permit
a crossing. Joseph Galloway, a Tory, later stated that there was ample
material in Trenton for the building of rafts, pontoons or boats, and
that, just as Howe’s men had failed to bring with them a single boat
from the Raritan, so now there was no effort made to construct suitable
craft. 3
3 Stryker, p.
37. See also Trevelyan, The American Revolution (Longmans, Green
and Co., 1903), pp. 21-2. “How provoking it is,” remarked an experienced
British officer, “that our army, when it entered the Jerseys, was not
provided with a single pontoon! Unless the object was Philadelphia,
entering the Jerseys was absurd to the last degree. If we had six flat-bottomed
boats, we could cross the Delaware.” Galloway’s statement was made before
the British House of Commons, June 18, 1779.
The British General, moreover, was quite content
to halt operations for the winter. With this idea in mind, he ordered
the formation of several cantonments, which Cornwallis proceeded to
establish at Elizabeth-Town, Brunswick, Princeton, Trenton and Bordentown.
Hessian troops were assigned to the latter points. And so, in addition
to having a series of outposts sadly lacking in coordination, the British
had foreign mercenaries unfamiliar with the very language of the patriots
stationed at the towns closest to the place where Washington and his
army were quartered.
Three
regiments of Hessian Infantry, a detachment of Artillery, fifty Hessian
yagers and twenty light dragoons were stationed in Trenton under command
of Colonel Johann Gottlieb Rall. The infantry regiments were headed,
respectively, by Rall, Von Knyphausen and Von Lossberg. The entire force
numbered about 1,400 men.
Howe’s
plan called for the placing of 1,500 men at Bordentown, and, on December
11, Colonel Von Donop left Trenton with the advance detachment, progress
being somewhat impeded, however, by operations of the militia in Burlington
County.
No
one knew better than did Washington that the American predicament called
for action. Congress was depressed. So were the people. On December
18, the commander-in-chief wrote to his brother: “If every nerve is
not strained to recruit the new army with all possible expedition, I
think the game is pretty nearly up . . . . You can form no idea of the
perplexity of my situation. No man, I believe, ever had a greater choice
of difficulties, and less means to extricate himself from them.” 4
4 Ford’s Writings
of George Washington, Vol. V, p. 109. “The trials of Washington,”
observes the historian Bancroft, “are the dark, solemn ground on which
the beautiful work of the country’s salvation was embroidered.”
But
Washington, in whom the country had the utmost confidence in spite of
current pessimism, did not for a moment weaken in his high resolve.
Throughout
the week before Christmas there was much discussion of a proposed movement
on the Hessian outposts at Trenton and Bordentown. Colonel Joseph Reed,
adjutant general of the Continental army, was one of the first to urge
a crossing of the Delaware, and soon there was general agreement that
some such stroke was precisely the thing to bolster up American hopes.
“If
you ever expect to establish the independence of these States,” said
Colonel John Stark at one of the staff meetings on this weighty matter,
“you must teach them to place dependence upon their firearms and courage.”
5
5 Stryker, p.
85. An interesting popular account of the formulation of plans for the
surprise attack on the Hessian outpost at Trenton is contained in Rupert
Hughes’ George Washington, 1762-1777, pp. 575-8.
Washington,
always quick to sense strategic wisdom, did not hesitate to gamble with
fate.
“VICTORY OR DEATH!”
On
Christmas Eve, detailed plans for the crossing of the Delaware and the
attack on Trenton were formulated. The final council of war was held
at the headquarters of Major General Greene. In addition to Greene and
Washington, there were present Generals Sullivan, Mercer, Lord Stirling,
Colonel Knox and other officers.
It
was decided to make an ambitious three-fold offensive Christmas night.
Washington was to cross at McKonkey’s Ferry, some nine miles north of
Trenton, and march down upon the Hessians with his force of approximately
2,400 men. General Ewing’s division was to negotiate the stream at Trenton
Ferry, directly opposite the village, with a view of cutting off Rall’s
retreat and preventing Von Donop from sending up reinforcements from
his station at Bordentown. Ewing commanded a force of 92 officers and
about 1,000 men. Cadwalader, with 1,800 men, was to cross somewhat further
to the south and proceed directly against Von Donop. With Rall and Von
Donop defeated and the Continentals in control of Trenton as well as
the enemy cantonments in the vicinity of Bordentown, it was planned
that the entire army should advance on the British strongholds at Princeton
and Brunswick.
Christmas
night was chosen for the attack by reason of the Hessians’ well-known
leaning toward unrestrained Yuletide celebrations. Hearty drinking and
a momentary lapse of discipline were counted on, and not in vain, as
the natural consequences of the Teutonic seasonal observance.
Marching
orders for the descent on Trenton from McKonkey’s Ferry were issued
by Washington on Christmas morning. An express rider was dispatched
to bring Dr. Shippen and surgical assistance, though subsequent events
were to prove how little this medical aid was needed.
Early
in the afternoon of Christmas day, the first regiment began to move,
and within an hour all parts of the northern expedition were on their
way to the Delaware. Unity of action had been facilitated by Washington’s
order that all officers should set their watches by his.
Each
man had three days’ rations and forty rounds of ammunition. In these
respects, there was adequacy. As for clothing and footwear, shivering
infantrymen and a bloody trail in the snow told a different story. “Sunshine
patriots” could not have faced this ordeal.
“What
a time to hand me letters!” exclaimed Washington, when, as he himself
was about to swing into his saddle for the ride to the ferry, a note
was given him with the information that General Gates had reported sick.
To the commander-in-chief, it seemed that, at the zero hour of national
destiny, the pen was scarcely mightier than the sword.
Rugged,
horny-handed seafarers from Marblehead, Mass., had charge of the boats.
They rendered yeoman service. With jagged cakes of ice floating swiftly
along the Delaware channel, theirs was a difficult task. A severe snow
and hail storm, accompanied by a biting wind, added to the arduous job
of transporting the chilled but determined army to the Jersey shore. 6
6 “Had not Colonel
John Glover’s splendid regiment of seafaring men from Marblehead, Mass.,
lent a willing and skilful hand, as he had promised they would;” says
Stryker, pp. 133-4, “the expedition would no doubt have failed.”
Washington
had anticipated getting the force across before midnight, so that the
attack on the drowsy Hessians could be made prior to the break of day.
But on this dark, stormy night facility of movement was out of the question.
It was four o’clock on the morning of December 26, 1776, before the
Continentals were ready to start on their march along the Jersey shore
toward Trenton. The last man had reached the eastern bank at three.
During the latter part of the crossing venture, Washington, awaiting
transport of his horse, had sat on a box once used as a beehive. What
a background for high resolve and earnest meditation - blinding snow,
piercing wind, the grunts of artillerymen with their cumbersome burdens,
the stentorian shouts of Colonel Knox.
“Victory
or Death!” had been given out as the password; the necessity for absolute
silence, obedience and order had been impressed on the men. At length,
four hours behind schedule, came the command, “Shoulder your firelocks
!” The weary tramp along slippery roads began.
Neither
the delay nor the weather could weaken Washington’s grim purpose. Existing
conditions, he later wrote, “made me despair of surprising the town,
as I well knew we could not reach it before the day was fairly broke.
But as I was certain there was no making a retreat without being discovered
and harassed on repassing the river, I determined to press on at all
events.” 7
7 Ford’s Writings
of George Washington, Vol. V, p. 132.
Meanwhile, General Ewing had found it impossible
to get a boat launched at Trenton Ferry, and Colonel Cadwalader, after
landing some 600 men on the Jersey side at Dunk’s Ferry, a few miles
below Bristol, was confronted by an icy barrier which made further progress
impossible. He therefore recalled those already across and bowed before
the elements.
CONFIDENT REVELRY
If there was chill misery at McKonkey’s Ferry, there
was warm cheer in Trenton. The Hessians who were not required to remain
on picket duty gathered around their fires, drinking and singing. Colonel
Rall was no man to stand aside and watch others celebrate. He, too,
was out to make a night of it.
Rall
was full of confidence, despite the fact that a Continental advance
on the Jersey shore of the Delaware was considered likely by his superior
officers. On December 24, General Grant dispatched a letter to Von Donop
at Bordentown, advising that he be upon his guard “against an unexpected
attack at Trenton.” And General Leslie, on the same day, sent a patrol
to Trenton with word that an attack on either Trenton or Princeton was
imminent.
“As
the American officers had anticipated,” says Stryker, “the Hessian troops
at Trenton, carelessly confident in their own military strength, entered
eagerly into the Christmas revelry as they did at home, and all day
and far into the night they continued their merrymaking, with some feasting
and much drinking with the people of the town.”
8
8 The Battles
of Trenton and Princeton, p. 117.
As late as Christmas morning, Colonel Rall received
word from General Grant that a detachment under General Lord Stirling
might be expected to attack the village sometime during the day. The
advice was without foundation, but it should have sufficed to keep Rall
alert. Instead, the confident Hessian, working on the theory that “these
country clowns can’t whip us,” made a cursory inspection of some of
the guards on the outskirts of town and then returned, late in the afternoon,
to the house of Stacy Potts, on King Street, where he maintained headquarters.
Scarcely had the Hessian commander joined his genial
host in a game of checkers when firing was heard. The village was immediately
thrown into a state of alarm. The troops fell in. Rall marched his regiment
to the junction of Pennington and Maidenhead Roads, but he soon received
news from Captain Von Altenbockum that the Americans, who had attacked
a picket on the Pennington Road, had been driven off and, after careful
search, could not be found.
Rall
was inclined to brush the incident aside as wholly trivial. Not so Major
Von Dechow, who was impressed by the latent possibilities and urged
upon Rall the desirability of sending out patrols to all the ferries
and along all the roads. Certainly a more vigilant commanding officer
than Rall would have done something besides permit officers and men
to return to their drunken revels. 9
9 Colonel Rall
is seriously censured for negligence in the finding of the Hessian Court
Martial, recorded by Stryker, pp. 411-19. Lack of prudence, underestimation
of the fighting capacity of the Continentals and failure to designate
alarm places are especially emphasized, but the conclusion is somewhat
softened by the following remark: “Colonel Rall having been mortally
wounded and died of the wounds received at the attack on Trenton he
cannot be held to answer these charges, and a decision cannot be justly
rendered against him.” For almost six months, the Hessian court was
in session intermittently at Philadelphia and New York, the final report
being sent to the Prince of Hesse, September 23, 1778.
The
party which attacked the Pennington picket was a small detachment from
Stephen’s brigade which had been engaged, without Washington’s knowledge
or permission, in scouting through Hunterdon County. General Stephen,
according to the commonly accepted version, was subsequently censured
by Washington for allowing the rovers to operate in a way which came
so close to warning the enemy against the imminence of a major attack.
As a matter of fact, however, the episode was fortunate for the Continentals,
by reason of Rall’s inference that this was the movement which had been
predicted by General Grant. Thus, far from being forewarned, the Hessians
were lulled into a sense of security which proved to be their undoing.
After
this flurry, Colonel Rall, instead of resuming his checker game with
Potts, went to the home of Abraham Hunt, at the corner of King and Second
Streets. Hunt was the rich merchant of the town and was always ready
to welcome guests with bounteous good cheer. Whether, as some patriots
then suspected, he had leanings in the direction of Toryism, Hunt certainly
aided the Continental cause on Christmas night, 1776, for the merriment
which he provided with open-handed generosity continued until early
morning and served to get Rall so drenched with intoxicating beverages
that he was in the poorest of conditions when Washington and his determined
band finally stormed the town.
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Even
while the Hessian commander was making the most of his fool’s paradise,
another warning arrived - and it, too, was spurned. A Pennsylvania Tory
came to Hunt’s door to tell Rall of the movements of the American army.
Refused admittance by a negro servant who was loath to interrupt the
evening’s jollification, the informant wrote a note which was duly delivered
to the roistering Hessian leader. Without so much as reading the missive,
Rall tucked it into his vest pocket.
Later,
dying of wounds, Rall said of the note, “If I had read that at Mr. Hunt’s,
I’d not be here.”
And
so, drinking and card-playing continued to occupy the attention of the
Hessian leader at the very moment when Washington’s loyal army of cold
and bleeding patriots was being organized for a stroke that was to mark
the turning-point of the Revolution.
10
10 A graphic picture
of the contrasting situations of the patriot and Hessian forces is contained
in excerpts from the diary of an officer on Washington’s staff, set
forth by Stryker, pp. 361-2.
PLAN AND CONDUCT OF THE
BATTLE
Washington’s carefully laid plans called for a separation
of the Continentals into two divisions for the march toward Trenton.
Upon being organized in column formation, the army proceeded as a unit
to Bear Tavern, about a mile f rom the river, and thence to Birmingham. 11 At this point, now known as Trenton Junction, “General Washington
stopped for a moment, and partook of the hospitality of Benjamin Moore,
while the column was halted, and the men made a hasty meal.”12
11 The route of
the Continentals from Bear Tavern has been subject to controversy. Dr.
Carlos E. Godfrey has adduced considerable evidence tending to show
that the army divided at Bear Tavern, Greene’s division crossing from
this point to the Scotch Road. There are those, on the other hand, who
hesitate to brush aside too readily the theory which has given little
Birmingham its fame. How explain away, they ask, the account of the
march given by General James Wilkinson, who participated therein, and
the version adopted by General Stryker, who was familiar with Washington’s
marching orders, and the Forrest diary which support the presumption
in favor of Bear Tavern? Stryker prints these documents in an appendix
to his history, yet he clearly states that the Continentals divided
at Birmingham. Why? We can only surmise. One supposition is that, after
crossing the Delaware, Washington learned of the short route that connected
Birmingham with the Scotch Road, well-posted local guides giving him
the information, and gladly took advantage of the opportunity to keep
both divisions together, and thus avoid a surprise attack upon either
between Bear Tavern and the village. The entry in Forrest’s diary, argues
the same side, may easily have been a slip of the pen, written with
the original marching orders in mind. It is significant that General
Stryker did not think it necessary even to explain away the documents
and maps now advanced to establish a different theory. Again, if the
so-called Pennington Road route had been followed, it would have carried
Generals Washington and Greene with one division past the Ewing Presbyterian
Church. Yet the church annals contain no reference to what would surely
have been a choice bit of parish history, nor did the members of the
congregation pass on to their descendants so striking and revered a
legend. On the contrary, the Rev. Eli F. Cooley, whose pastorate began
in 1823 and who spent many years in historical and genealogical research
among the families of his charge, wrote a series of sketches upon Revolutionary
incidents for the State Gazette in 1842-43, in which he deliberately
described the division of the army at Birmingham. Persons interested
in this issue will find Dr. Godfrey's argument thoroughly developed
in a paper read before the Trenton Historical Society, March 20, 1924.
12 Stryker, p.
141.
Before reaching Birmingham, where the column was
scheduled to divide, Captain John Mott informed Major General Sullivan
that the storm was causing the priming powder to become damp.
“Well,
boys,” shouted the determined Sullivan, “we must fight them with the
bayonet.”
Washington,
also informed of the condition, sent his aide-de-camp to “tell the General
to use the bayonet and penetrate into the town; for the town must be
taken and I am resolved to take it.”
13
13 Stryker, p.
140. It is urged by those who believe the army marched as a unit until
reaching Birmingham that this verbal exchange would scarcely have been
feasible if the division of forces had taken place at Bear Tavern.
The column left Birmingham in two divisions, the
first under Major General Sullivan along the River Road and the second
under Major General Greene along the Scotch Road. General Washington
accompanied Greene’s division.
Sullivan
was supported by the brigades of Brigadier General St. Clair, Colonel
Glover and Colonel Sargent and the batteries of Captains Neil, Hugg,
Moulder and Sargent; Greene, by the brigades of Brigadier Generals Stephen,
Mercer, Lord Stirling and de Fermoy, Captain Morris’ Philadelphia troop
of light horse and the batteries of Captains Forrest, Bauman and Hamilton.
Birmingham
is little more than four miles from Trenton, the distance by the River
Road being somewhat less than that by the route of Greene’s division.
Daylight
appeared before the tattered Continentals, many of them without shoes,
had covered half the distance from Birmingham. But their courage was
kept at high pitch by Washington’s reiterated, “Press on, press on,
boys!”
Colonel
Rall, about this moment, left the convivial scene at Abraham Hunt’s,
plodded to his headquarters, flung his clothes aside - the telltale
note still tucked away in his vest pocket - and confusedly lunged into
bed to dream of even better Yuletide celebrations in far-away Hesse.
A
Hessian patrol ventured forth about five o’clock as far as Captain John
Mott’s house, on the present site of the New Jersey State Hospital,
only to return with the report that the enemy was nowhere in sight.
“An hour later and a march a mile farther,” says Stryker, “would probably
have changed the condition of affairs in Trenton at eight o’clock, and
Washington would have found a foe ready to receive him.”
14
14 The Battles
of Trenton and Princeton, p. 146.
Shortly before eight o’clock, the advance party of
Greene’s division came upon the Hessian picket post on the Pennington
Road. Lieutenant Wiederhold’s sentinels challenged the Americans, and
when it was evident that the approaching force consisted of Continentals,
the guards ran from the house, shouting, “The enemy! The enemy! Turn
out! Turn out!”
Three
volleys were fired by the Americans. Wiederhold was forced to retreat,
and, though soon joined by Captain Von Altenbockum’s company, came so
close to being surrounded and cut down that a hurried withdrawal was
necessary.
When
a young Hessian officer fell, mortally wounded, during the retreat down
the Pennington Road, Captain Samuel Morris, of the Philadelphia light
horse, showed a desire to stop and aid his dying foe. A sharp order
from General Greene checked the display of sympathy. This was no time
for anything but a vigorous advance.
Shortly
after Greene’s division routed the upper picket, General Sullivan reached
the Hessian outpost at the Hermitage, residence of General Philemon
Dickinson, on the River Road at the outskirts of Trenton. Captain John
Flahaven’s detachment caused the Hessians stationed there to retreat,
a movement in which they were forced on by Colonel Glover’s brigade.
Meantime, the firing had proved to be an effective
alarm for the force in town. The retreating pickets were being driven
“pell-mell” into Trenton, and, as the Americans swept on, it became
evident to the Hessian officers that there was no time for delay. All
would be lost if defensive organization were not effected speedily.
Lieutenant
Jacob Piel, attached to the Von Lossberg regiment, was quick to act
when the firing was heard. He dispatched a detail to ascertain the cause
of the disturbance, and then went directly to Colonel Rall’s house.
Awakened by the knocking at his door, Rall shouted from an upper window,
“What's the matter?” Piel mentioned the firing. “I’ll be out in a minute,”
said Rall. He had been on the street but a second or two when the American
guns began to sweep the streets of the town.
Sullivan
had reached Trenton ahead of Greene and Washington, and the commander-in-chief
of the Continentals was greatly relieved thereby, as is shown in the
following account by a member of his staff:
15
15 Stryker, p.
363.
General Washington’s face lighted up
instantly, for he knew that it [the boom of a cannon] was one of Sullivan’s
guns. We could see a great commotion down toward the meeting-house,
men running here and there, officers swinging their swords, artillerymen
harnessing their horses. Captain Forrest unlimbered his guns.
Washington gave the order to advance,
and we rushed on to the junction of King and Queen Streets. Forrest
wheeled six of his cannon into position to sweep both streets. The riflemen
under Colonel Hand and Scott’s and Lawson’s battalions went upon the
run through the fields on the left to gain possession of the Princeton
road . . . .
It was on the spot where the Trenton Battle Monument
now stands that Captain Forrest’s six-gun battery and the second company
of the Pennsylvania artillery unit began combing Queen Street, while
the New York artillerymen, commanded by young Alexander Hamilton, sent
volley after volley down King Street.
General
Washington took up a position on the high ground at what is now Princeton
Avenue. This point gave him an excellent opportunity to watch developments
and to direct the course of the engagement. Tradition has it that his
chestnut sorrel horse was severely wounded and that another animal had
to be procured. 16
16 Stryker, p.
160.
The
various units of the Hessian forces were formed, meanwhile, more or
less successfully, but the attack of the Americans had been so much
in the nature, of a surprise, and Colonel Rall was in so befuddled a
condition, that it was quite impossible to secure coordination in the
defending ranks.
Poor
Rall was unable even to give intelligent replies to subordinate officers
coming to him for instructions. “Forward! Forward!” he exclaimed repeatedly
without himself having a very clear idea as to where or for what purpose.
“These
are the times that try men's souls,” the onrushing Americans are said
to have shouted, taking a certain ironical delight in thus adapting
to military purposes the clarion call coined by Thomas Paine.
THE ENEMY LOSE CONFIDENCE
Rall’s
men lost confidence in their leader. They lost confidence in themselves.
They began falling back in confusion, unable to stand against the deadly
shots of the Americans who had wisely found vantage places in houses
and cellars where their powder could be kept dry and their firing directed
with uncanny accuracy.
With
General Sullivan’s division rapidly taking possession of the southern
part of the town, the regiments of Rall and Von Lossberg withdrew to
the low ground known as “The Swamp,” between what are now Stockton and
Montgomery Streets, north of Perry.
“Forward
march!” cried the confused Rall. “Attack them with the bayonet!”
The Hessians momentarily responded, but soon they
were in disorderly retreat. Despite the fact that their colors had been
displayed, their ranks re-formed, the band forced to play and order
brought, for the moment, out of chaos, the Teutonic mercenaries could
not face the withering fire of the American rifles.
It
was under such discouraging conditions that Colonel Rall fell, frightfully
wounded by two Continental shots. Leaderless, his troops virtually abandoned
the fray and retreated to the apple orchard at the eastern edge of the
village. 17
17 See Trevelyan’s
The American Revolution, pp. 108-9, for a stirring description
of the brilliant futility displayed by Rall’s brigade during this final
attempt at recovery.
In
the southern part of town, the Von Knyphausen regiment was making a
futile attempt to escape by way of the bridge over the Assunpink Creek
which already had proved to be a safe avenue of retreat for some of
the Hessians. But General Sullivan, anticipating such a move, had blocked
the way with well-placed infantry and cannon, so that the Hessians,
hemmed in on all sides, finally engaged in a parley with their aggressive
antagonists and surrendered.
Rall
had been shot from his horse on Queen Street in front of the house of
Isaac Yard. After reclining on the ground momentarily and suffering
much pain, he was assisted by two soldiers into the Methodist Church,
at Queen and Fourth Streets.
In
the meantime, the Rall and Von Lossberg regiments could see from their
position in the orchard that they were virtually surrounded by the excited
and determined Americans. Lieutenant Colonel Scheffer and Major Von
Hanstein received one of Washington’s aides-de-camp, probably Lieutenant
Colonel Baylor, and at last decided to recognize the inevitable and
lay down their arms. Standards were lowered, guns grounded, and officers’
hats placed on the points of swords as an indication of surrender.
“The
patriot troops,” according to Stryker, “tossed their hats in the air,
and a great shout resounded through the village, as the surrender was
made, and the battle of Trenton closed.”
18
18 Stryker, p.
185.
As defeat came swiftly to his soldiers, so death
came with anything but laggard steps to Colonel Rall. The proud Hessian
commander lay in the Methodist Church until after the surrender. Then
he was placed on a bench and carried to headquarters on King Street,
the house of Stacy Potts. Here, while being disrobed, Rall saw the note
which he had tucked away and which brought forth his well-known remark
of regret.
Generals
Washington and Greene called on the mortally wounded Rall, conversed
briefly with him and took his parole of honor. In response to a request
from Rall, Washington assured him that the prisoners would receive kind
treatment. Rall died the following evening, December 27, 1776. German
records tell of his burial in the Presbyterian churchyard, East State
Street, but the exact location of his grave is unknown.
19
19 Colonel Rall
was born in 1725. He served with distinction in the .Seven Years’ War
and performed creditably in some of the earlier engagements of the Revolutionary
War, including the Battle of Long Island and the capture of Fort Washington.
He was a lover of colorful military display, but was, nevertheless,
a man of marked personal bravery. “His memory has been cursed by German
and English soldiers, many of whom were not fit to carry his sword,”
said Captain Johann Ewald, the one Hessian writer who fails to hold
poor Rall up as an object of censure.
FRUITS OF VICTORY
“This
is a glorious day for our country, Major Wilkinson,” General Washington
remarked to this gallant young officer when informed of the Hessian
surrender. And indeed it was a glorious day. What had been a well-nigh
hopeless cause was transformed by a remarkably executed stroke into
one which commanded confidence.
As
modern battles go, the losses on neither side were great. The Americans
went virtually unscathed, two officers and two privates wounded being
the official report of Washington. Reports of the Hessian casualties
vary slightly. In the New Jersey Archives,
20 the number of men and officers
killed is given as 35; wounded, 60; captured, 948. Washington placed
the total number killed, wounded and captured at 918, but his return
was made out the day after the battle and hence could scarcely have
been as accurate as later compilations.
20 Second series,
Vol. IV, p. 450.
However, it was not in point of enemy troops put
out of action that the first Battle of Trenton contributed so markedly
to the American cause. Serving as a patriotic tonic, it did much to
revive the hopes of the army and to give Congress and the people generally
a revitalized vision of better days to come. At a single stroke, a poorly
clad, ill-fed mob of discouraged campaigners had been changed into a
confident band which justified the spreading confidence that the cause
of national independence was far from a state of collapse. The battle
proved, moreover, that the highly touted German mercenaries were by
no means invincible, and that Continental tradesmen and merchants who
could shoot were infinitely more effective in battle than gaudily uniformed
professionals who could drill. In addition, the justifiable feeling
spread that George Washington was an able strategist and that in point
of leadership the American Army need not bow its head before any foreign
band. 21
21 cf. Trevelyan,
pp. 119-20. If the Hessians had earned their evil reputation for brutality,
they were sufficiently mild and docile in captivity to win the hearts
of their conquerors. “They had been poor soldiers at Trenton,” is the
dry comment of Trevelyan, “but they made most excellent prisoners.”
The
rebirth of patriotic ardor inevitably had an effect upon enlistments,
sorely needed by Washington in view of the fact that the army had just
about reached the point of dissolution through expiration of terms.
Word winged its way throughout the Colonies that a glorious victory
had been won in Trenton. And, as in the case of Connecticut, men began
flocking to the colors by the hundreds, anxious to participate in this
revived burst of national zeal.
Truly
it was a turning-point in the fight for freedom. Coming when and as
it did, there is no doubt whatsoever that the first Battle of Trenton
opened the way to ultimate victory.
INTERLUDE
“In
justice to the officers and men,” said General Washington, in his report
to the Continental Congress, “I must add that their behavior upon this
occasion reflects the highest honor upon them.”
It
was no exaggeration. And, not only did the Continentals behave well
in battle but they behaved well in victory. The Hessians in New Jersey
had won for themselves a reputation for barbaric conduct. 22 They
had seized personal property and were accused on all hands of conduct
unseemly if not actually criminal. It would have been natural for a
conquering American army to bear down upon them without mercy. Instead,
the Hessians were treated with every consideration, both by the military
and civil conquerors into whose hands they had fallen through that “unfortunate
affair” on the eastern shore of the Delaware.
22 Stryker, p.
222.
The battle over, Washington without undue delay ordered
the prizes collected, the troops lined up and the march back to the
ferry begun, soon after the middle of day. In contrast with the grim
body that had tramped the nine miles some six hours earlier, it was
indeed a joyous host.
At
McKonkey’s Ferry, the prisoners of war were sent across first. Nor was
the crossing much easier than it had been the night before. One boatload
of German officers came near being lost and it was only after a hard
battle with the icy current that the Pennsylvania shore was reached.
After
the whole detachment had returned to their former camps and barracks,
headquarters for the army were established near Newtown, to which point
the enlisted men of the Hessian army were marched at once. On December
28 the American officers entertained the Hessian commanders at dinner,
and pleasantries were exchanged with good feeling predominant on both
sides. 23
23 Stryker, pp.
208-9.
The
Hessian prisoners at Newtown signed a parole of honor, and Washington
more than made good his promise to Rall by allowing them to keep their
personal baggage without examination.
Soon
after giving their parole, the Hessian officers were sent to Philadelphia,
the enlisted men following afoot on December 30. They were all treated
hospitably, as was the case, also, after they were scattered throughout
the western counties of Pennsylvania and parts of Virginia. Many of
them preferred to remain in America when the war was over, settling
in the German communities of the Keystone State.
Receiving word from Adjutant General Joseph Reed
to the effect that Trenton was deserted, Washington resolved to recross
the Delaware and reestablish himself in New Jersey. General Greene,
with 300 men, took the town, and Washington himself followed on December
30 in advance of the main body.
Upon
reaching Trenton, Washington established headquarters at the home of
Major John Barnes, a loyalist, on Queen Street near the Assunpink Creek
bridge, where he remained until January 2. He then moved to Jonathan
Richmond’s tavern to the south of the bridge.
During
these days, while Trenton was again the scene of intensive military
activity, General Cornwallis was in New York busily planning a return
trip to England for the purpose, in part at least, of informing the
King of the great success being attained by the British army in New
Jersey. But he was to receive a rude awakening.
General
Howe, informed of the “unhappy affair” at Trenton, quickly ordered the
prospective voyager to resume command of his forces. Cornwallis promptly
cancelled his arrangements and, on January 1, joined General Grant at
Princeton, the latter already having moved with his force from Brunswick,
leaving about 600 men to guard the supplies.
24
24 Stryker, p.
247.
Washington,
meanwhile, had received extraordinary powers from the hands of Congress,
in session on December 27 at Baltimore. His position now was not only
that of commander-in-chief of the Continental army but also that of
virtual dictator. “Happy it is for this country,” read the letter informing
Washington of the Congressional resolution, “that the General of their
forces can safely be entrusted with the most unlimited power, and neither
personal security, liberty nor property be in the least degree endangered
thereby.”
“Instead
of thinking myself freed from all civil obligations, by this mark of
confidence,” Washington wrote to the Congressional notification committee,
penning his letter from the Richmond Inn, Trenton, January 1, “I shall
constantly bear in mind, that as the sword was the last resort for the
preservation of our liberties, so it ought to be the first thing laid
aside, when those liberties are firmly established.”
|
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II. The Second Battle
IT
WAS a motley army which made ready, on the high ground at the south
side of Assunpink Creek, to meet the anticipated advance of the British.
Experienced soldiers who had become accustomed to the smell of powder
were not only diminished in number but quite exhausted as a result of
the rigors of recent campaigning. The green troops, recruited in the
flush of victory over the Hessians, were lacking in discipline though
determined in spirit and ready to render the fullest measure of service
to the American cause. 25
25 “His army,”
says Trevelyan of Washington’s force at the second Battle of Trenton,
“was a medley of unequally sized and very dissimilar fragments, of which
the best were the smallest.” The American Revolution, p. 129.
THE BRITISH FORCES MARCH
FROM PRINCETON
The
British forces, divided into three columns, started the march from Princeton
before daybreak on January 2. General Cornwallis was in command. General
Leslie’s brigade was ordered to remain at Maidenhead, and Grant’s brigade,
under command of Lieutenant Colonel Mawhood, was left in Princeton as
a rear-guard, with the understanding that it was to proceed to Trenton
on January 3. After making these precautionary arrangements, Cornwallis
had about 5,500 men for the expected engagement with Continental troops
in Trenton.
On
the first day of the new year, Washington’s forces had been augmented,
as a result of orders from headquarters, by the divisions of General
Cadwalader and General Mifflin. The two bodies had joined at White Horse
Tavern and advanced as a unit to Trenton.
Washington had sent scouting parties to obtain the
position and, if possible, the intentions of the enemy. With the desired
information at hand, he ordered out a detachment under Brigadier General
de Fermoy for the purpose of taking a position somewhat to the south
of Maidenhead and offering at least temporary resistance to the British
advance.
Before
the detachment came in contact with the redcoats, General de Fermoy
himself returned to Trenton, but Colonel Edward Hand, assuming command,
decided to fall back on the town as slowly as practicable and endeavor
to impede the British in every possible way. In this, he achieved marked
success with his able regiment of Pennsylvania riflemen. So persistently
did the Americans dispute the territory at one point that the enemy
battalions of Von Linsingen and Block were drawn up in order of battle,
fully convinced that the major engagement which they had anticipated
was about to begin.
The
condition of the roads was another factor which contributed to a fulfilment
of Washington’s plan that the British be delayed all day. Mild weather
had caused the ground to thaw, and the heavy mud was an obstacle of
serious proportions for Cornwallis and his heavily equipped army.
Finally
falling back upon the town in their battling retreat, the Americans
offered another bit of stiff resistance at the ravine which led down
to Assunpink Creek. Here earthworks and a number of guns enabled the
Virginia troops, commanded by Captain William Hull and reinforced by
General Greene, to hold out against the British until about five o’clock
in the afternoon.
Washington
was well pleased with the hindrance and delay which had been forced
on the approaching enemy, and when Cornwallis’s main column began marching
down Queen Street, the American commander was prepared to meet the onslaught
from the strategic position in which the main Continental army was posted
to the south of the Assunpink.
26
26 Warren Street
at the time did not extend below Front Street. The Assunpink was bridged
only at King (Broad) Street, and this single-arched crossing was “scarce
sixteen feet wide,” so that not without difficulty were the American
skirmishers, who had helped all day to check the enemy’s progress, able
at the last moment to crowd through the passage, their retreat being
protected under cover of friendly fire from the south bank of the creek.
See also Stryker, p. 261.
It was well after five o’clock, and growing darker
moment by moment, when the British line reached the bridge and made
its first futile effort to storm the span and gain the other side.
Continental
batteries, under Captains Moulder, Forrest and Read, together with infantry
fire from the American positions to the east and west of the bridge,
proved sufficient to stave off three British advances. In the dusk,
accurate firing was extremely difficult, but the Continentals had a
great defensive advantage in being able to concentrate on the bridge
and keep up withering volleys, throwing out a screen of shot and shell
which the redcoats were quite unable to penetrate.
General
Washington, meanwhile, is said to have remained on horseback at the
American end of the bridge, ignoring personal exposure, as he also did
later at Princeton, in order to encourage his men. 27
27 Stryker, p.
264. This fact in itself indicates the importance which Washington attached
to holding the bridge against the British and thus staving off a fight
to the finish with Cornwallis’ formidable force.
Hessian
troops made a vigorous attempt to cross the stream at a point somewhat
to the west of the bridge, but Colonel Hitchcock’s brigade, which had
thrown up temporary breastworks on the Bloomsbury farm, checked the
movement abruptly by means of a well-directed curtain of lead.
Commenting
on the failure of the British to make other similar efforts, Stryker
says: 28
It will always appear singular that the invaders
did not attempt to cross the creek at some of the many fording-places
on the east of the town, such as Henry’s Mill or Phillips Ford, the
one a mile, the other two miles, above the mill-dam at the bridge. It
was impossible for General Washington to protect the whole stream, and
had the British forced the American right and driven them toward Trenton
Ferry and the river, nothing could have saved the entire army. A determined
advance along the line and a half hour’s fight would have decided the
battle. The American army would have been well-nigh annihilated, and
with it the fate of America and the hopes of freemen.
28 The Battles
of Trenton and Princeton, p. 268.
The rapid approach of darkness and Cornwallis’ conviction
that the American forces were bottled up in such a way as to prevent
escape may have been responsible for this singular tactical omission,
as well as for the British General’s neglect, later that night, to send
out patrols and scouting parties and to establish picket-lines on the
Continentals’ exposed flank.
That
he would “bag the old fox” in the morning was the confident forecast
of Cornwallis.
“If
Washington is the General I take him to be, his army will not be found
there in the morning,”was the cautious rejoinder of Sir William Erskine,
Baronet, Colonel and aide-de-camp to the King.
29
29 Stryker, p.
268.
HEAVY BRITISH LOSSES
It
is hard definitely to estimate the British losses at the bridge over
the Assunpink. The official reports make no mention of them, though
authentic statements by a number of eye-witnesses picture them as being
very heavy. The American losses are known to have been slight.
General
Washington’s official report contains the following description of the
engagement:
After some skirmishing the head of their column
reached Trenton about four o’clock, whilst their rear was as far back
as Maidenhead. They attempted to pass Sampink Creek, which runs through
Trenton, at different places, but, finding the fords guarded, they halted
and kindled their fires. We were drawn up on the other side of the creek.
In this situation we remained till dark, cannonading the enemy, and
receiving the fire of their fieldpieces, which did us little damage.
“We
kept possession of the bridge,” said Captain Thomas Rodney of Delaware,
“although the enemy attempted several times to carry it but were repulsed
each time with great slaughter.”
30
30 ibid.,
p. 266, note.
As
to the importance of the second Battle of Trenton in relation to the
patriot cause, it is unquestionably true that this later engagement,
sometimes known as the “Battle of the Assunpink,” was of even greater
moment than the surprise attack on the Hessians the week before. Had
the forces of Lord Cornwallis been successful in their attempts to storm
the bridge, Washington might have found his army split asunder and the
struggle for national independence brought to a sudden, unfavorable
end.
Most historians of the Revolutionary period have slighted the event, 31 despite the fact that there is an abundance
of available evidence which tends to elevate the second Battle of Trenton
to a plane of major significance.
31 This is doubtless
due, in large part, to the dearth of official records as to killed and
wounded. It should be remembered, however, that the battle took place
toward dusk, that Washington and his army left for Princeton during
the night and that Cornwallis hurriedly withdrew early the next morning
to pursue the Continentals. Under these circumstances, detailed casualty
lists are scarcely to be expected. What probably happened is that the
British dead were left where they fell, the exigencies of the moment
preventing either identification or enumeration.
In
the Connecticut Journal of January 22, 1777 - published less
than three weeks after the engagement - appears the following graphic
description:
Immediately after the taking of the Hessians
at Trenton, on the 26th ult., our army retreated over the Delaware,
and remained there for several days, and then returned and took possession
of Trenton, where they remained quiet until Thursday, the 2nd inst.,
at which time, the enemy having collected a large force at Princeton,
marched down in a body of 4,000 or 5,000, to attack our people at Trenton.
Through Trenton there runs a small river, over which there is a small
bridge. Gen. Washington, aware of the enemy’s approach, drew his army
(about equal to the enemy) over that bridge, in order to have the advantage
of the said river, and of the higher ground on the farther side. Not
long before sunset, the enemy marched into Trenton; and after reconnoitering
our situation, drew up in solid column in order to force the aforesaid
bridge, which they attempted to do with great vigor at three
several times, and were as often broken by our artillery and obliged
to retreat and give over the attempt, after suffering great loss, supposed
at least one hundred and fifty killed. 32
32 Quoted in the
Historical Collections of the State of New Jersey, Barber and
Howe, pp. 299-300.
This,
it will be noted, indicates that the number of British killed was nearly
five times as great as the casualty list for the first Battle of Trenton.
AN EYE-WITNESS ACCOUNT
Another
account which lends emphasis to the memorable fight at the Assunpink
bridge was written by an eye-witness and printed in the Princeton
Whig of November 4, 1842:
When the army under Washington, in the year ‘76,
retreated over the Delaware, I was with them. At that time there remained
in Jersey only a small company of riflemen, hiding themselves between
New Brunswick and Princeton. Doubtless, when Washington reached the
Pennsylvania side of the river, he expected to be so reinforced as to
enable him effectually to prevent the British from reaching Philadelphia.
But in this he was disappointed. Finding that he must achieve victory
with what men he had, and so restore confidence to his countrymen, it
was then that the daring plan was laid to recross the river, break the
enemy’s line of communication, threaten their depot at New Brunswick,
and thus prevent their advancing to Philadelphia; which was only delayed
until the river should be bridged by the ice. But Washington anticipated
them. I was not with the troops who crossed to the capture of the Hessians.
It was in the midst of a December storm, that I helped to reestablish
the troops and prisoners on the Pennsylvania shore. The weather cleared
cold, and in a few days we crossed on the ice to Trenton. Shortly afterward
a thaw commenced which rendered the river impassable, and consequently
the situation of the army extremely critical.
In the morning of the day on which the
battle of the Assunpink was fought, I, with several others, was detached
under the command of Captain Longstreet, with orders to collect as many
men as we could in the country between Princeton, Cranbury, and Rhode
Hall, and then unite ourselves with the company of riflemen who had
remained in that neighborhood. We left Trenton by the nearest road to
Princeton, and advanced nearly to the Shabbaconk (a small brook near
Trenton), when we were met by a little negro on horseback, galloping
down the hill, who called to us that the British army was before us.
One of our party ran a little way up the hill, and jumped upon the fence,
from whence he beheld the British army, within less than half a mile
of us. And now commenced a race for Trenton. We fortunately escaped
capture; yet the enemy were so near, that before we crossed the bridge
over the Assunpink, some of our troops on the Trenton side of the creek,
with a field-piece, motioned to us to get out of the street while they
fired at the British at the upper end of it. Not being on duty, we had
nothing to do but choose our position and view the battle.
Washington’s army was drawn up on the
east side of the Assunpink, with its left on the Delaware River, and
its right extending a considerable way up the mill-pond, along the face
of the hill where the factories now stand. The troops were placed one
above the other, so that they appeared to cover the whole slope from
bottom to top, which brought a great many muskets within shot of the
bridge. Within 70 or 80 yards of the bridge, and directly in front of,
and in the road, as many pieces of artillery as could be managed were
stationed. We took our station on the high ground behind the right,
where we had a fair view of our line, as far as the curve of the hill
would permit, the bridge and street beyond being in full view. The British
did not delay the attack. They were formed in two columns, the one marching
down Green‑street to carry the .bridge, and the other down Main-street
to ford the creek, near where the lower bridge now stands. From the
nature of the ground, and being on the left, this attack (simultaneous
with the one on the bridge) I was not able to see. It was repelled;
and eye-witnesses say that the creek was nearly filled with their dead.
The other column moved slowly down the street, with their choicest troops
in front. When within about 60 yards of the bridge they raised a shout,
and rushed to the charge. It was then that our men poured upon them
from musketry and artillery a shower of bullets, under which however
they continued to advance, though their speed was diminished; and as
the column reached the bridge, it moved slower and slower until the
head of it was gradually pressed nearly over, when our fire became so
destructive that they broke their ranks and fled. It was then that our
army raised a shout, and such a shout I have never since heard; by what
signal or word of command, I know not. The line was more than a mile
in length, and from the nature of the ground the extremes were not in
sight of each other, yet they shouted as one man. The British column
halted instantly; the officers restored the ranks, and again they rushed
to the bridge; and again was the shower of bullets poured upon them
with redoubled fury. This time the column broke before it reached the
center of the bridge, and their retreat was again followed by the same
hearty shout from our line. They returned the third time to the charge,
but it was in vain. We shouted after them again, but they had enough
of it. It is strange that no account of the loss of the English was
ever published; but from what I saw, it must have been great. 33
33 Barber and
Howe, pp. 300-1.
In
addition to these weighty bits of evidence, C. C. Haven, Trenton historian
who was a faithful and earnest student of local Revolutionary lore,
quotes General Wilkinson, John Howland, Major General Greene and one
A. Cuthbert, son of a Revolutionary officer, all of whom lay stress
on the magnitude of the military action at Assunpink bridge.
34
34 Haven, Thirty
Days in New Jersey Ninety Years Ago, pp. 35-47. For additional comment
on Mr. Haven, see Chap. XV, below. An interesting article on this man
who contributed so much to a more complete understanding of the second
Battle of Trenton was written by John J. Cleary and published in the
Trenton Sunday Times-Advertiser of November 11, 1923. In the
article appear several verses of a poem, probably written by Edward
S. Ellis, once superintendent of the Trenton public schools, which show
the esteem in which Mr. Haven was held. Three of the verses follow:
Now tier on tier our patriots ranged themselves
upon the ridge,
And now again the redcoats charged upon Assunpink
bridge;
Three times Cornwallis’ hosts, with ringing shout
and shell,
Came rushing down upon us like the very hosts of
hell!
But artillery and musketry we poured
in deadly rain,
And often as they yelled and charged,
we beat them back again,
Until the victory was ours! All hail
our Washington !
Assunpink’s battle has been fought, Assunpink’s
battle won!
And honor the historian whose patriotic
pen
Has told these deeds with vivid power,
unto his countrymen;
Whose four-score winters with their frosts
have only fanned the flame,
And with our Country’s good and true
we proudly link his name.
Howland,
who participated in the battle and who subsequently became president
of the Historical Society of Rhode Island, made the following observation:
Night closed upon us, and the weather, which had
been mild and pleasant through the day, became intensely cold. On one
hour - yes, on forty minutes, commencing at the moment when the British
troops first saw the bridge and creek before them - depended the all-important,
the all-absorbing question, whether we should be Independent States
or conquered rebels ! Had the army of Cornwallis, within that space
have crossed the bridge or forded the creek, unless a miracle intervened,
there would have been an end of the American army.
35
35 Haven, Thirty
Days in New Jersey Ninety Years Ago, p. 39.
When these descriptive and interpretative statements
are considered in the aggregate, it becomes plain that the second Battle
of Trenton was, for the Continental army, a defensive operation of vast
import. Whereas in the surprise of the Hessians Washington was the aggressor
engaged in attacking what was at best a mere outpost, in the clash at
the Assunpink he was defending against a formidable British army under
the most competent leadership. That he was able to emerge victorious
may be said, without any exaggeration, to have been a saving factor
for the patriot cause.
WASHINGTON’S POSITION STILL PRECARIOUS
But
in spite of the success of the moment, Washington’s position was decidedly
precarious. To face the foe on the morrow would be almost suicidal.
To retreat toward Bordentown would assure ultimate defeat. Here was
a situation to test the capacity of a commander and to call forth all
the shrewdness which some of the British leaders were by this time attributing
to the Continental chief.
The
shrewdness asserted itself. Washington called a council of war at the
house of Alexander Douglass, headquarters of Brigadier General St. Clair,
the General’s own quarters at the Richmond tavern having been abandoned
because of the proximity of the enemy. Before this gathering of Continental
leaders, Washington outlined his plan of strategy.
36
36 An illuminating
account of this and attendant events was given by Counsellor William
J. Backes before the Caliphs on December 28, 1915, and was reported
in the Trenton Sunday Times-Advertiser of January 2, 1916. The
Douglass House stood on the site of the present German Lutheran Church,
South Broad Street. It has since been sold and removed to Mahlon Stacy
Park. Dr. Carlos E. Godfrey delivered an accurate and informative address
on the second Battle of Trenton before the Caliphs on January 2, 1919.
It was at this meeting that steps were taken to form the Trenton Historical
Society. An account of the proceedings, together with Dr. Godfrey’s
address, was published in the State Gazette of January 3, 1919.
This plan, one of the boldest strokes in military
history, called for a decamping movement, a forced march that night
through the woods around Trenton and a surprise attack on Princeton,
from which point, as already noted, most of the British forces had been
withdrawn for the purpose of moving on Trenton. The virtue of the scheme
lay not only in the possibility it offered for avoiding a finish fight
with the splendidly equipped army of Cornwallis but also in its appearance
as an offensive drive rather than as a hopeless retreat. Washington
well knew that his inexperienced troops needed encouragement and a taste
of victory if they were to maintain their spirits. The proposed attack
on Princeton was exactly the right medium.
Orders
to this effect, therefore, were given, though men and subordinate officers
below the rank of Brigadier General were not informed as to the end
in view, the element of secrecy being so effectively obtained that some
of the Continental officers who had gone to the rear for much needed
rest were left behind and forced to find their commands as best they
could the following day. 37
37 Trevelyan,
p. 133. Referring to Chapter XV of General Stryker’s classic work, Trevelyan
says: “The account there given of Washington’s flank-march is illustrated
by the local knowledge of a neighbor, and the oral traditions accessible
to the member of an old Revolutionary family.”
Camp
fires were kept burning on the high ground along which the Continentals
were posted. Throughout the night, these fires were visible from the
British positions, and the sound of earthworks being thrown up to the
south of the creek added to the realistic effect of the camouflage.
At the bridge and at various fording places, American guards paced to
and fro. If ever an army was completely fooled, it was this army of
the complacent Cornwallis.
ON TO PRINCETON
Under cover of darkness, the flank movement began.
The heavier guns and surplus supplies were sent out under General Stephen,
who, with a strong guard, was to take them to Burlington by way of Bordentown.
Not long after midnight, the main army began to move, headed by an advance
party under Major Isaac Sherman, of Connecticut, and including the brigades
of Brigadier General Mercer and General St. Clair. Washington and his
staff accompanied the latter division.
The
route lay along the Sand Town Road, near what is now Hamilton Avenue.
Much care was exercised lest the enemy should hear the movement and
become alarmed. The wheels of the gun carriages were wrapped with pieces
of cloth; the need of absolute silence was impressed upon officers and
men. Before reaching Sand Town, a small group of houses at the present
location of Mercerville, the army veered to the north and crossed Miry
Run, a stream running in a westerly direction into Assunpink Creek.
From this point, the route was north by east across Quaker Bridge and
thence due north to Clarksville, across Stony Brook, where three brigades
under General Sullivan split from the main army that they might enter
Princeton from the east. 38
38 See map, Stryker,
p. 279. The Sons of the Revolution have marked this Trenton-Princeton
route with granite obelisks, out Hamilton Avenue, through Greenwood
Cemetery and via the Quaker Creek road.
A
fortunate change in the weather facilitated the movement. Whereas Cornwallis
in his march on Trenton had been impeded by the mud, Washington’s forces
were benefited by a drop in the temperature which froze the roads and
made it comparatively easy to transport even the artillery. But the
wooded sections through which the troops were forced to pass were something
of an obstacle, for the Continentals suffered “many a fall and severe
bruise,” according to John Howland, of Colonel Lippitt’s Rhode Island
regiment, in their encounter with the trees.
39
39 Stryker, p.
276.
Lieutenant
Colonel Mawhood, meanwhile, started for Trenton with the 17th and 55th
Infantry and fifty light horse. Upon approaching Stony Brook, the British
discovered the advancing forces of Washington and immediately attacked
a detachment of several hundred men under General Hugh Mercer as the
latter was carrying out Washington’s orders to destroy the bridge at
Worth’s Mill in order to thwart the anticipated pursuit by Cornwallis.
In this engagement, which took place in an orchard,
General Mercer received numerous wounds from British bayonets. 40 His men were momentarily demoralized, but soon
Washington and Greene came up with the main army, and, with their commander-in-chief
personally waving them on to victory, the Americans made their superior
numbers felt and forced the British to retreat. As the redcoats fell
back upon the town there was some additional fighting, a final stand
being made in Nassau Hall, where, it is said, an American cannon-ball
entered the building and crashed through a portrait of George II. Before
the structure itself was badly damaged, the British showed a white flag
at one of the windows and the Battle of Princeton was brought to a close.
41
40 Suffering intensely,
General Mercer lived until Sunday, January 12. Death came in spite of
the efforts of an American surgeon, sent by special order of Washington
and allowed to pass through the British lines by Lord Cornwallis.
41 See “The Battle
of Princeton,” an address delivered by Professor Thomas J. Wertenbaker,
of Princeton University, at the annual meeting of the New Jersey Historical
Society at Newark, N.J., October 31, 1928. This admirable address has
been published in the Proceedings of the New Jersey Historical Society,
New Series, January 1929, Vol. XIV, No. 1.
Cornwallis awoke at Trenton only to discover that
the “old fox” had escaped. Not much time was lost sizing up the situation,
and early in the morning the British commander had his men on the way
back to Princeton, “running, puffing and blowing, and swearing at being
so outwitted.”
After
getting control of the town, Washington wisely decided to leave Princeton
at once and to head north toward the desirable position at Morristown.
His men were too tired, as a result of steady campaigning, to risk an
attack on the British base at Brunswick.
42 And to delay at Princeton
would be to face the necessity of meeting Cornwallis and the strong
force at his disposal. Even with quick action, however, Washington’s
rear-guard was still within sight of Princeton as the advance detachments
of British Infantry were approaching the southern entrance of the town.
Nevertheless, Washington was able to reach Somerset Court House unmolested
and to continue on to Morristown without another clash of arms.
42 “For two nights
and a day,” says Stryker, “they had had no sleep, and many of them had
carried their arms without intermission for nearly forty hours on the
march and in battle . . . . General Washington declared that if he had
had but 800 fresh troops, he could have made a forced march, destroyed
their stores and magazines, taken their money-chest, and possibly have
put an end to the war.” The Battles of Trenton and Princeton,
p. 300.
“THOSE WONDERFUL DAYS”
To
say that the Battles of Trenton, culminating in the brilliant stroke
at Princeton and the march to Morristown, marked a turning of the tide
of war in favor of the Continental cause is to state what must be admitted
by the student of “those wonderful days in New Jersey.’ Never was a
military outlook more discouraging than that which Washington faced
toward the end of the year 1776. Never was a military recovery more
successful than that finally written into the record with the dawn of
the year 1777.
When
Washington and his army retreated from New York to their vantage point
across the Delaware from Trenton, the great city of Philadelphia was
threatened with Hessian pillage and destruction. When, a few weeks later,
the patriots reached Morristown, the Quaker City was safe.
When
the British mercenaries were strongly encamped in a line running from
Amboy to Bordentown, New Jersey at large was quite helplessly ensnared
in the enemy mesh. When the winter campaign of 1776-77 ended, the Colony,
with the exception of the British posts at Brunswick and Amboy, was
free from hostile control.
When
the Continentals were fleeing before the well-equipped host from Europe,
the English cause gained in vigor while that of the patriots inevitably
suffered from the blight of defensive discouragement. But with the close
of the campaign, these conditions were quite reversed, and the psychological
advantage lay with the Americans by virtue of “two lucky strokes.”
As
for the effect of the campaign upon the military prestige of George
Washington, it was Lord Cornwallis himself, who, after the capitulation
at Yorktown, remarked: “When the illustrious part that your Excellency
has borne in this long and arduous contest becomes matter of history,
fame will gather your brightest laurels rather from the banks of the
Delaware than from those of the Chesapeake.”
43
43 Trevelyan,
p. 143. “At that moment, and before that audience,” adds this British
commentator, “Washington’s generalship in the Chesapeake campaign must
have represented an exceptionally high standard of comparison.”
Henry Cabot Lodge in The Story of the Revolution,
pp. 146-7, library edition, 1919, Charles Scribner’s Sons, makes the
following significant comment: “With a beaten and defeated army operating
against overwhelming odds, he had inflicted upon the enemy two severe
defeats. No greater feat can be performed in war than this. That which
puts Hannibal at the head of all great commanders was the fact that
he won his astonishing victories under the same general conditions.
There was one great military genius in Europe when Washington was fighting
this short campaign in New Jersey - Frederick of Prussia. Looking over
the accounts of the Trenton and Princeton battles, he is reported to
have said that it was the greatest campaign of the century. The small
numbers engaged did not blind the victor of Rossbach and Leuthen. He
did not mean that the campaign was great from the number of men involved
or the territory conquered, but great in its conception, and as an illustration
of the highest skill in the art of war under the most adverse conditions.”
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