

LEE'S LAST OFFENSIVE

By Carole E. Scott

Early in March 1865, General Robert E. Lee told Confederate President Jefferson Davis that the evacuation of the Army of Northern Virginia from Petersburg was just a matter of time. Preventing him from immediately withdrawing was that his starving artillery and draught horses were too weak to deal with the roads at that time of year. Later, when the roads dried out, his starving army would withdraw. Meetings with Davis had convinced Lee there was not going to be a political initiative to end the war

Lee thought General William T. Sherman would likely defeat General Joseph E. Johnston in North Carolina. When this happened, Sherman's army would be combined with General Ulysses S. Grant's at Petersburg; thereby substantially increasing the already huge numerical advantage Grant's army had over Lee's.

Grant had turned his attention to Petersburg, a major rail hub of the Confederate supply system located 23 miles South of Richmond, after Lee thwarted him in the 1864 battles of the Wilderness (5-6 May), Spotsylvania Court House (8-21 May), the North Anna River (23-26 May), and Cold Harbor (1-3 June) that cost Grant a lot of men. Because it produced nearly half

the Confederacy's factory output, keeping Richmond, the Confederacy's capital, out of the hands of the Yankees was more than symbolically important.

The origin of the dire straits Lee faced in March 1865 was in dated back to June 15, 1864 when the Federals had attacked Petersburg, whose Confederate garrison was composed largely of old men and boys and disabled soldiers led by General P. G. T. Beauregard. They were vastly outnumbered and outgunned by the Federal troops who captured their Dimmock line of earthen fortifications. Beauregard retreated to earthworks closer to the City and was reinforced by Lee.

The Dimmock line, consisting of 55 open at the rear artillery batteries and associated infantry earthworks, was built by the Confederates from 1862 to 1864. An advantage of an open to the rear artillery battery was that it facilitated removing its guns. A drawback was the relative ease of capturing it by attacking it from the rear.

After the failure of a Federal attack on Petersburg on June 18, Federal General George Meade ordered his troops to build earthworks. Thus began a 10-month siege of Petersburg that pinned down a lot of Confederate troops. In a letter Lee wrote before the siege began he said, "We must destroy this Army of Grant's before he gets to the James River. If he gets there it will become a siege and then it will be a mere question of time." The James River merges with the Appomattox River near Petersburg at City Point (now Hopewell.).

The Confederate and Federal lines at Petersburg were so close together that it was almost certain death for a man to show his head above the works on the front line. Because it would expose you to enemy sharpshooters, it was dangerous to expose yourself in the rear unless you were out of musket range. There were a number of deep trenches extending to the rear beyond musket range. Some of them were covered with timber overlaid with earth. Shelling took place daily.

The Federal troops in their front line were relieved by fresh troops every few days, so they were not subjected to the wear and tear of constant harassing duty and danger both day and night as were the Confederates, who had only enough men to thinly occupy their one line of works. Each side had a heavy line of chevaux de frise, with an occasional opening sufficient to allow a man to pass through, a short distance before their front line. Confederates slept in covered holes behind their works.

The balance of power steadily tipped in the Federals' favor. They cut the roads and railroads connecting Petersburg with the rest of the Confederacy until Lee's only way to bring in supplies was a makeshift one via the Boydton Plank Road and the Southside Railroad. Grant had a massive Federal supply base at City Point that large ships could reach. He also had a 30-mile-long railroad built to deliver supplies to his men. City Point was also the site of his headquarters.

In March 1865, the fortified lines at Petersburg were in an area of battle scared, rolling hills largely denuded of trees. Facing 37 miles of Confederate works at varying distances were Federal works consisting of a front line of earthen redoubts or forts connected by a chain of earthen breastworks. At intervals there were smaller, unenclosed fortifications called lunettes or batteries.

The Federal forts, said General James A. Walker, commander of the Third Division of the Army of Northern Virginia's Second Corps, "were filled with artillery and infantry, and so arranged that the fire from the guns or one would sweep not only over the ground in its immediate front, but in front of the breastworks and the neighboring forts to the right and to the left; so that an attacking force would have to face not only a direct fire from the artillery of at least three forts. In the rear of this first line, on the hills beyond Harrison's creek, the Federals had a second line, very much like the first, and so constructed that the forts in this line commanded the forts and breastworks composing the first line."

Among the forts on the second line was Battery 4, formerly Confederate Battery 5, and Fort Friend, formerly Confederate Battery 8. The latter about three-quarters of a mile northeast of Fort Stedman. "The second line," Walker said, "was not occupied by infantry all the while, but the troops were encamped behind these lines, and near enough to be thrown into them in a very short time if occasion required."

At the end of January 1865, the Federal army outnumbered Lee's desertion plagued army by almost two to one. Lee's army was dependent on supplies from the lower South, where it seemed likely the Federals would be victorious. All would be lost if the Federal armies there joined with Grant's.

If Lee's army captured part of the Federals' fortifications, Grant would constrict his long siege lines around Petersburg which, by making it possible for him to defend Petersburg with fewer men, would make it possible for him to send some troops to Johnson's endangered army in North Carolina. Lee asked General John B. Gordon to devise a plan for achieving this.

Gordon, a 33-year-old Georgian, who before the war operated a coal mining company, was one of the most successful commanders in Lee's army. After the Battle of the Wilderness, Lee had made him a major general and put him in command of a division. Gordon had no military training or experience before the war. This lack was offset by his instinctive grasp of tactics and aggressiveness.



Interior of Fort Stedman



Federal Picket Line at Fort Stedman

After surveying the lines at Petersburg, Gordon saw that the Confederate and Federal front lines were exceptionally close to each other between the Federal works on Hare's Hill, where Federal Fort Stedman was located, and the heavily fortified Confederate Colquitt Salient, which was located on the continuation of the ridge upon which Fort Stedman stood. The batteries

in and around Colquitt mounted 20 guns. A triple row of chevaux-de-frise protected it from assault. Lee accepted Gordon's proposal for an attack aimed at Fort Stedman and its neighboring works. The Meade Station, a stop on the Federals' military railroad, was behind Stedman.

Only a night stood had a chance of being successful. If a breakthrough through the Federal line was achieved, General W. H. F. "Rooney" Lee's cavalry would gallop beyond Fort Stedman and destroy Grant's railroad and telegraph lines and cut away his pontoon bridge across the river. The cavalry's objective was to reach City Point, possibly capturing Grant, and destroy the supplies stored there.

Both Lee and Gordon believed a night attack on Fort Stedman and adjoining works was a desperate strategy, but they thought it was better than any alternative. "To wait," Gordon said after the war, "was certain destruction. It could not be worse if we tried and failed." To carry out this attack, the Army of Northern Virginia's last offensive action, Lee gave Gordon nearly half of his army

In addition to his Second Corps, for the attack Gordon had Matt W. Ransom's and William H. Wallace's brigades from the Fourth Corps, giving him a total of around 11,500 men. That Lee stripped the rest of his front in order to provide these troops to Gordon indicates how very desperate he was. General George Pickett was supposed to come with his First Corps from Richmond, but did not arrive because an axle of the tender of the train that was to transport them broke. Gordon believed he would have taken City Point if Pickett's men had arrived.

On March 24 Lee told General James Longstreet to be ready to attack on the North side of the James River in order to prevent troops from being sent to the other side to assault Gordon's men. Also taking place on March 24, but unknown to the Confederates, was Grant issuing orders whose objective was to destroy the Danville and Southside railroads, turn Lee's right, and force Lee to abandon his entrenchments there.

Leading Gordon's three pronged attack were the commanders of the three divisions of Gordon's Second Corps, Generals Bryan Grimes, Clement Evans, and James Walker. The targets of Gordon's three columns were: an area between Battery 10 and Stedman; directly at Stedman; and between Stedman and Battery 11.

Gordon's plan was after dark on March 24 for the obstructions defending the Colquitt Salient to be removed in order to provide a passage for his men to make the attack. Gordon planned to initiate the attack with a sudden, quick dash of three, 100-men groups who would capture or, if necessary, bayonet the enemy's pickets. Because the signal for the 4:00 AM attack to begin was a gun shot, these men carried unloaded muskets. General Walker said that, "in front of Fort Stedman the hostile sentinels [pickets] were not more than fifty yards apart, but they kept a sort of truce between themselves, never tried to harm one another, and beguiled the weary hours chaffing each other."


After a passage way was cut through the abatis protecting Stedman, three groups of fifty men with axes would chop their way through Stedman's cheviot-de-frise. Each group of axmen, still wielding their axes, would rush forward accompanied by 100 sharpshooters through the gap they created. To keep these men from killing each other in the dark, Gordon had his wife, who was staying in Petersburg, tear white cloth into strips for them to wear. Waiting at the Colquitt

Salient to advance if the axmen and sharpshooters were successful were the rest of Gordon's men.

Fort Stedman was a seven-sided, earthen redoubt that had four, light 12-pound guns manned by the 19th New York. It was garrisoned by 300 men of the 29th Massachusetts Infantry. Covering about three quarters of an acre, it had a moat and a nine-foot wall. It was located about 150 yards from Colquitt's Salient and two miles from the center of Petersburg. It was protected by both a thick row of abatis and chevaux-de-frise. It was one of the weakest Federal work. It was badly deteriorated due to heavy Confederate fire, had no bastions, and only four cannon.

To the North of Fort Stedman were Battery 9, Battery 8, and Fort McGilvary. To the South of Fort Stedman were Battery 11, Battery 12, and Fort Haskell. Located 2,200 yards behind Stedman was Meade's railroad station, the Federal Ninth Corps supply depot. Realizing that Stedman's nearness to the Confederate lines made it a likely Rebel target, Federal General John F. Hartranft's troops were positioned nearby. The Federals had two redoubts, Avery and Friend, located on the mostly now flattened Confederate Dimnock line to cover Stedman. Stedman covered Meade's Station and the Federals' 30-mile long railroad--the first railroad built exclusively for military use.

Batteries 10, 11 and 12 were to all intents and purposes, one work. Shielding Fort Stedman on the right, Battery 10 was an open work mounting two cannon and mortars. On the ridge to the left was Battery 11, a small, V-shaped ravelin for two guns. Beyond Battery 11 a curtain extended to Battery 12, a nearly square redoubt mounting four Coehorn mortars. In front of Batteries 11 and 12 the ground fell down into shallow, creek-lined ravines. Sited on high ground one-half mile to the south of Fort Stedman was Fort Haskell, a strong fortification mounting six guns, besides mortars. The most vulnerable point for attack was between Stedman and Battery 9.



Source:

http://thomaslegion.net/imagelib/sitebuilder/misc/show_image.html?linkedwidth=actual&linkpath=http://www.thomaslegion.net/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderpictures/battle-of-fort-stedman-map.jpg&target=tlx_new&title=Petersburg%20Siege%20Map

More photos and other illustrations are in the reference section.

Gordon and Walker claim that Federal pickets were convinced by Gordon's men assigned to deal with the Yankee pickets that they were gathering never harvested corn, and the Yankees let them stay. Federals claim they convinced the pickets they were deserters. Confederates who deserted were paid by the Federals for any arms they brought with them.

After Stedman was captured sharpshooters were to dash to its rear shouting that the Rebels have captured Fort Stedman. When accosted, they were to claim they were Federals ordered by Federal General Napoleon B. McLaughlin of the Ninth Corps to go to the rear. Some

of them had been given the names of Federal officers who they were to claim to be. Their objective was to get to an open area behind three forts and attack them. Attacking them from the rear was because Gordon believed that, if they were fully manned, they could be captured by frontal assault only “at great sacrifice to our troops”.

Gordon said these men failed to find the three forts because they couldn't find the guides assigned to them. Confederate General James Longstreet, some Federal sources, and historian Douglas Southall Freeman, said the three forts did not exist. After the war in a letter to Federal General Orlando B. Willcox, Federal General John C. Tidball, chief of the Ninth Corps artillery, said that Fort Friend, Battery 4, and Fort Avery were “no doubt” the “chief objective points” named by Gordon and others.

Initially the attack on Fort Stedman exceeded Gordon's “most sanguine expectations.” Asleep or playing cards and drinking, its garrison was caught by surprise. Within minutes it and Batteries 10 and 11 were taken, and a gap nearly 1,000 feet long in the Federal line was opened up by using captured guns to clear the entrenchments both to the North and the South of Stedman. Hundreds of Federal troops were captured.

The Confederates crowded into the encampments of the 29th and 57th Massachusetts regiments camped behind the Federal front line. “It was a complete surprise,” declared a North Carolina Confederate. “Many were killed coming out of their tents by our men using their guns as clubs.”

It took over an hour for General Walker's entire division to come up and form a line, so it was sunrise before they were ready to advance. The Cavalry was held in reserve until a way was cleared for them. Moving into the labyrinth of bomb proofs behind Stedman broke up the Confederate formation. Some Confederates lost sight of their duty as they entered the booty-rich bomb proofs where men lived like troglodytes. One Confederate wrote that some of the half-starved Confederates were soon busy searching the bomb proofs and covered ways for rations.

Confederate artillery at Colquitt's Salient bombarded Fort Haskell. Federal artillery returned fire. Repeated attempts by Gordon's men to storm Fort Haskell and Battery 9 failed. Federals at Fort Haskell fended off the Confederates with canister. Thinking Haskell had been captured by Rebels, for a while other Federal works fired on it.

Upon hearing the noise of the attack, Federal General McLaughlen went to Fort Haskell. Because Battery 11 had been captured by Gordon's men, McLaughlen ordered Battery 12 to fire on it, and the 59 Massachusetts briefly retook it. Believing that Fort Stedman had been also been retaken, McLaughlen rode across a parapet into Fort Stedman. Assuming in the darkness that made it difficult to distinguish blue from gray that the men he saw firing Stedman's guns were Federals, he began giving them orders, which they obeyed. McLaughlen thought they were firing on Rebels until he realized that one of the men had a Confederate uniform on. McLauthten was taken prisoner and conducted to Gordon, who he gave his sword to. The Federal officer of the day who was looking for McLaughlen made the same mistake and ended up a prisoner.

Bringing order to the chaos among their troops were Federal Generals John G. Parke, commander of the Ninth Corps; General Orlando B. Willcox, commander of the First Division of the Ninth Corps; and General John F. Hartranft, commander of the Third Division of the Ninth Corps. Hartranft was notified by McLaughlen's headquarters at 5:10 AM that a portion of the Federal lines had been captured. Moments later General Parke ordered him to move his brigade at Meade's Station to reinforce General Willcox.

Because it was not possible to communicate with Generals Grant and Meade at City Point, it was up to the Federal generals where the attack took place to deal with the attack. General Hartranft was notified by McLaughlen's headquarters that a portion of the Federal lines had been captured. Moments later General Parke ordered him to move his brigade at Meade's Station to reinforce General Willcox. After he arrived at Willcox's headquarters and found he was in the process of moving to the rear, Hartranft took technical command of all offensive action. Because Gordon's men cut the telegraph lines, Grant didn't know about the attack, the noise of which could not be heard at City Point.

Hartranft, whose men were spread along the ridgeline from Stedman to Meade's station, discovered that the "sudden and impetuous Confederate attack" had carried the Federal line from Battery 9 to Fort Haskell; thus putting into the hands of Gordon's men Fort Stedman and Batteries 10, 11, and 12 along with the bomb proofs and covered ways connecting them. Fire from Fort Haskell and Battery 9 had driven the Confederates into the bomb-proofs.

After the sun rose, all the siege artillery from Federal batteries 4, 5, 8, 9, Fort Haskell, and all the light artillery which General Tidball could concentrate upon the position, opened and maintained a heavy fire upon the Confederates. This fire prevented them from being re-enforced and killed or wounded many of them.

Hartranft organized his Pennsylvania troops and scattered portions of other commands and halted the Confederates just short of Meade Station. The combination of massive Federal artillery shelling from a number of positions and the advance of Willcox's and Hartranft's troops resulted in the capture of Stedman. Just as Hartranft began the attack that overwhelmed the Confederates in Stedman, he was ordered to halt and wait for reinforcements, but, believing victory certain, he disobeyed the order. Hartranft believed that if Haskell and Battery 9 had been lost, Gordon would have been able to destroy the railroad the Federals' supplies.

When General Walker's skirmishers fell back to Fort Stedman, they found it occupied by the Federals, and they were forced to surrender. Ransom's men who had taken shelter near Battery 9, isolated and with no means of retreat, laid down their arms and surrendered.

"The full light of the morning," Gordon wrote, "revealed the gathering forces of Grant and the great preponderance of his numbers. It was impossible for me to make further headway with my isolated corps." He reported that, "A consuming fire on both flank and front during this withdrawal caused a heavy loss to my command."

Viewing the action from the Colquitt Salient, Lee saw that the Federals had rallied; called up reserves; and were pouring into Fort Stedman and the adjoining works. To remain was useless

and would cost more lives. At around 8 AM he ordered Gordon to withdraw. Later in the day, assuming that the attack had weakened the Confederate line where the attack took place, parts of the Federal Second and Sixth Corps captured the entrenched Confederate pickets there; thus weakening the Confederate line. It has been estimated Gordon's failed attack may have reduced Lee's army by up to 4,000 or more men. Reports of Federal losses were much smaller.

When the command for the Confederates to fall back arrived, General Walker said, "the retrograde movement, which was a thousand times more hazardous than the advance because it was now in the full blaze of daylight, and the seventy-five yards that lay between Fort Stedman and our shelter was swept by the direct and cross fire of many pieces of artillery posted in both the first and second lines of the enemy's works." Rather than face it, many men surrendered.

One Federal observer was appalled by the sight of fleeing Rebels being picked off by the dozens as they fled into no-man's land. "My mind sickens a memory of it—a real tragedy in war—for the victims had ceased fighting and were now struggling between imprisonment and death or home."

On March 24th President Abraham Lincoln, accompanied by his wife and son, Tad, had arrived at City Point on the "River Queen" steamer so he could confer with Grant. A division-size parade Lincoln was supposed to review on March 25 was postponed to the afternoon. Grant and Lincoln took the train to General Meade's headquarters, where Lincoln saw some prisoners from Fort Stedman. Pointing at them after he was handed a dispatch about Stedman having been retaken, he declared, "Ah, there is the best dispatch you can show me from General Parke." Lincoln saw Hartranft at Meade's station and assumed, as many ever after did, he was responsible for the victory, he promoted him then and there to major general.

After the Southside Railroad was cut at Five Forks on April 1, Lee told Davis Petersburg and Richmond would have to be abandoned that night. On April 2 the Federals mounted a sudden, unexpected early morning attack near Confederate Fort Mahone. Defending Fort Mahone was General Gordon.

After being pounded by artillery, the Confederates at Fort Mahone and the Yankees fought with rifle butts and bayonets. A soldier with the 53rd North Carolina said that "the open space inside Fort Mahone was literally covered with blue-coated corpses." Mahone fell.

Petersburg fell on April 2, but it was not occupied until April 3 because of the exceptional defense put up by the possibly no more than 300 Confederates occupying Fort Gregg, the Confederate Alamo. The few hundred men in Fort Gregg faced thousands of Federals rushing through a gap in Gordon's lines. Their ferocious resistance and refusal to surrender bought enough time for their army to retreat across the Appomattox River. Only about ten percent of the men in Fort Gregg survived.

At 5 AM on April 9, Gordon led the last attack made by Lee's army in an unsuccessful attempt to break through the Federal lines. Lee surrendered on April 9. Gordon led the Confederate troops in the surrender ceremonies.

A study by a business that sells Confederate uniforms of photos taken of Confederate dead at Fort Mahone taken the day after they were killed suggests that “a typical Confederate soldier in the trenches at the Battle of Petersburg would have been slim, in his early twenties, or late teens, had a fairly short haircut, and no facial hair. He would have worn a black, wool felt “British import” hat, a suit of cadet gray Richmond jacket with cadet gray or domestic fabric pants, and standard, Jefferson-style brogans. He may have had a patterned shirt or a depot-issue, white osnaburg shirt.”

Some believe Gordon was the first head of the Ku Klux Klan in Georgie, but his has never been proven conclusively. In 1871 Congressional testimony Gordon said, “I do not know anything about any Ku-Klux organization, as the papers talk about it. I have never heard of anything of that sort except in the papers and by general report.” However, he admitted that he was approached and asked to “attach myself to a secret organization in Georgia” that was organized for self-protection in response to the “sense of insecurity and danger, particularly in those neighborhoods where the negro population largely predominated.”

“We knew,” Gordon testified, “of certain instances where great crime had been committed; where overseers had been driven from plantations, and the negroes had asserted their right to hold the property for their own benefit....Men were in many instances afraid to go away from their homes and leave their wives and children, for fear of outrage....We were afraid to have a public organization; because we supposed it would be construed at once, by the authorities at Washington, as an organization antagonistic to the Government of the United States.”

One of the first members of the Klan was Confederate General George W. Gordon, a Pulaski, Tennessee attorney who was Tennessee’s fist KKK Grand Dragon.

After the war Gordon used slave labor to mine coal. That he was able to do so was the result of the fact that the war destroyed Georgia’s economy. A great many commercial and manufacturing enterprises and farms had been destroyed. Railroad engines, cars, and tracks were destroyed. For a while there was the threat of starvation. Among the vast number of buildings destroyed was the state penitentiary. Former slave laborers were free; had to be paid wages; and could not be whipped. The state government’s potential tax revenue and loans didn’t amount to much, and the Federal government didn’t aid its defeated enemy like it did after World War II.

The new Thirteenth Amendment offered the State relief because it said: “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist in the United States. So, in 1868 Georgia’s military provisional governor, Thomas Ruger, instituted a convict lease system modeled on Massachusetts’ 1798 system. Leasing out convicts provided the State with revenue and reduced its costs because those who leased convicts were responsible for feeding, clothing, and housing them. To obtain convicts to lease to coal mining companies is it has been claimed that a concentrated effort was made by sheriffs and judges to arrest and impose excessive sentences on blacks.

Before the war enslaved laborers were property, so there was an incentive to keep them alive and healthy. It was not rare for slaves to live beyond the years when they were capable of

working. There was no incentive to spend more on leased convicts in order to keep them healthy. As a result, they were poorly fed, clothed, and housed. Their death rate was high. Pre-war slaves were whipped, but some convicts were spared whipping because it was more efficient to punish them with what today is called waterboarding.

Those who got convict lease contracts could, as Gordon did, provide convicts to sub-contractors. It has been claimed that an increase in what you had to bid to get a contract is what eventually made it possible to get the General Assembly (Georgia's legislature) to eliminate it in 1908. Instituted at that time was the state working prisoners as roadside chain gangs.

The most significant politicians in Georgia for decades after the war were Gordon, Alfred H. Colquitt, an old friend that the salient was named for, and Joseph E. Brown, who was Georgia's governor during the war. All three were involved in railroading, coal mining, and other businesses. Cheap convict labor was said to have turned Brown's coal mine into a gold mine. In 1886, a rebellion of convict miners at Brown's Dade Coal Company exposed the horrors of the system.

A friend of Gordon, Robert A. Alston, a Confederate veteran who was a member of the General Assembly, was the first man in Georgia to expose the horrors of the convict leasing system. In 1879, Gordon gave Alston a power of attorney to sell his interest in Penitentiary Company No. 2. Edward Cox, who was also a Confederate veteran, subleased 60 of Gordon's convicts to work on his farm. He claimed he would be ruined if Gordon's contract was sold to who Alston planned to sell it to. When Cox ran into Alston in an Atlanta barber shop and Alston refused to sell the contract to who Cox wanted it sold to, Cox pulled a knife and threatened to cut Alston's throat.

Later that day Alston and Cox met in the State Treasurer's office and began to argue. Both of them pulled out pistols and shot each other. Alston received a fatal bullet in the head. Alston was given a life sentence and sent to Brown's coal mine to serve it. He was not sent there chained like other convicts were, and at the mine he milked cows and looked after livestock on the farm which supplied food to the convicts. In 1880, when Gordon resigned from the U.S. Senate to become a railroad attorney, Governor Colquitt appointed Brown to replace him. In 1882, Cox was pardoned by Governor Alexander H. Stephens, who had been vice president of the Confederate States of America.

By the time he became Georgia's governor in 1886, Gordon had decided that convict leasing, once a "necessary expedient," had outlived its usefulness, and he proposal abolishing it. When his proposal was turned down by the General Assembly, he inaugurated the most thorough investigation of the system ever conducted. It revealed, he believed, there was excessive whipping and in some cases unreasonable and excessive labor; so he fined each convict lease company \$2,500.

REFERENCES AND PHOTOS

Full account of the March 25, 1865 Confederate attack led by General John B. Gordon:
https://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_books/civil_war_series/20/sec7.htm



<http://www.beyondthecrater.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/FortStedmanAftermathNPSMap.gif>




Confederate General John B. Gordon

<http://www.beyondthecrater.com/resources/bat-sum/petersburg-siege-sum/the-battle-of-fort-stedman-summaries/>



Confederate General James A. Walker https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_A._Walker



Fort Stedman bombproof <https://www.loc.gov/item/cwp2003005237/PP/>



Retaking of Fort Stedman


<http://www.beyondthecrater.com/resources/bat-sum/petersburg-siege-sum/the-battle-of-fort-stedman-summaries/>



Looking from Gracie's Salient to Colquitt Salient <http://www.petersburgproject.org/gracies-dam.html>



Federal Fort Haskell (inside) <http://www.petersburgproject.org/fort-haskell-panorama.html>




Confederate chevaux-de-frise at Petersburg <http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2012646282/>




Federal abatis at Petersburg

<http://www.civilwar.org/battlefields/petersburg/10-facts-about-the-petersburg.html>



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Federal General John C. Tidball, third from right http://www.civil-war.net/cw_images/files/images/437.jpg




Federal General John F. Hartranft

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Confederate Fort Mahone <http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/cwp2003000600/PP/>


Shown here are mole hill ramparts.



FORT MAHONE, (OR FORT DAMNATION), PETERSBURG.

APRIL, 1865.

After captured by Federals http://www.fortwiki.com/Fort_Mahone



Federal Fort Sedgwick (inside) located opposite Fort Mahone

<http://civilwartalk.com/threads/earthworks-and-fortifications.85769/>



General Napoleon McLaughten (second from right) <https://www.loc.gov/item/89708447/>



City Point <https://www.loc.gov/item/2005689624/>